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The Emerging Oversimplifications of the Government
Speech Doctrine: From Substantive Content to a
“Jurisprudence of Labels”
Barry P. McDonald
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past couple of decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has
created, and continues to develop the contours of, what it refers to
as the “government speech” doctrine. In its current incarnation, this
doctrine holds that whenever it can be said that the government is
engaging in speech, then it is not subject to First Amendment
limitations with respect to the impact its actions or message may
have on private speakers associated with that speech. Under some
iteration of this doctrine, the Court has sanctioned the imposition of
normally prohibited viewpoint restrictions on private speakers who
accept government funds1 or on government employees speaking on
matters of public concern;2 the compulsion of private party funding
for speech with which it disagrees;3 and the selective exclusion of
speakers from traditional public fora based on the content of the
speakers’ message.4 In other words, the government speech doctrine
has become a First Amendment “escape hatch” for placing
substantial restrictions or burdens on private speakers that would
otherwise be subject to serious judicial scrutiny and constitutional
doubt if traditional free speech principles were applied to these
situations.

 Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I would like to express my
thanks to John Fee for conceiving of and spearheading the symposium at which I first
presented these thoughts. I owe him additional thanks for inspiring the title of this Article.
While thinking about “The Emerging Complexities of Government Speech,” as John had
titled the symposium, it occurred to me that many of those conceded complexities are the
product of the Court’s current oversimplification of the driving principles which animate the
government speech doctrine.
1. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
4. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
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In this Article, I will briefly trace the development of the
government speech doctrine and demonstrate that it has become
unhinged from its original purpose of assisting in the ordering of
governmental and private speech interests in cases where they
intersect and conflict. Instead, the current Court has transformed the
doctrine from a tool of substantive analysis into what Justice Breyer
has recently termed “a jurisprudence of labels.”5 On this view,
whenever the Court can label a message involving the interaction of
both government and private speakers as primarily that of the
government, it washes its hands of assessing the constitutionality of
the burdens placed on the interests of the private speakers. I will
contend that this modern development is misguided and urge a
return to a formulation and application of the government speech
doctrine as it was originally conceived.
II. ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Although the Court has, thus far, applied the government speech
doctrine in the context of four different types of cases—those
involving compelled subsidies by private parties of another’s speech,
restrictions attached to government subsidies of private speech,
government employee speech, and speech on public property—it
arose in the first category of cases: claims by private speakers that
being compelled by the government to financially subsidize speech
with which they disagree violates the First Amendment.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,6 a group of public school
teachers contended that the government violated their First
Amendment rights by making them pay the equivalent of member
dues to a private teachers’ union that espoused views on various
issues.7 The Court disagreed with this to the extent the union used
the payments to fund collective bargaining activities germane to its
purpose, but agreed it was unconstitutional to compel funding for
political or ideological activities with which the plaintiffs disagreed.8
5. Id. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring). It should be clear by now that the scope of my
undertaking in this Article is very specific—to examine the Court’s recently-created
government speech doctrine. Hence, I make no attempt to address the multitude of other First
Amendment issues that may arise in connection with the government’s role as a speaker. For
one classic exposition of such expanded issues, see MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS (1983).
6. 431 U.S. 209, 215 (1977).
7. Id. at 211–17.
8. Id. at 217–37.
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Justice Powell wrote separately to urge stronger First Amendment
protections for the plaintiffs than the majority appeared to require.9
As part of his argument, he added a footnote explaining why
ordinary taxpayers could be made to fund government, but not
private, speech with which they disagreed.10 According to Powell,
“the government is representative of the people,” while unions are
“representative only of one segment of the population . . . with
certain common interests.”11 In other words, he appeared to be
arguing that because in our democratic system the government is the
appointed agent of at least the majority of the people who elect it, it
is fair enough for those who disagree with its policies to also fund its
speech. On this view, one could say dissenting taxpayers consent to
such an arrangement under the democratic social contract we are
presumed to accept.
Several years later, the Court was facing the question of the
extent to which an integrated state bar association (i.e., one that
lawyers of a state are required to join and pay member dues to) could
use a member’s dues to fund political or ideological speech with
which that member disagreed.12 Drawing on Justice Powell’s
footnote in Abood, the defendant State Bar of California argued that
as a government entity, it was entitled to spend member dues on
whatever speech it wished as long as it was pursuing legitimate
government goals.13 This was so, it argued, because government
bodies must take positions that some taxpayers will inevitably
disagree with in order to perform their legitimate functions of
governance.14 Indeed, this argument had persuaded the California
Supreme Court in the decision below to reject the First Amendment
claims of the dissenting bar members.15
Labeling this “the so-called ‘government speech doctrine,’”
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, appeared to
accept the logic of it but held that the California State Bar (“State
Bar”) was not sufficiently like an ordinary government agency to
avail itself of the doctrine.16 Pointing out that the State Bar received
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 244–64 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 259 n.13.
Id.
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
Id. at 10–11.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11–13.
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its funding from member dues instead of legislative appropriations,
lacked direct enforcement authority with respect to its rules, was
created to provide “specialized professional advice” to the State
Supreme Court, and consisted of lawyers rather than general citizens
or voters, he reasoned that the State Bar was not like “traditional
government agencies and officials” which “are expected as a part of
the democratic process to represent and to espouse the views of a
majority of their constituents.”17 Accordingly, Rehnquist concluded
it would be inappropriate to shield the State Bar against compelled
funding challenges pursuant to the rationale of the government
speech doctrine. Moreover, he reasoned, since the regulatory
purpose of the State Bar was analogous to that of a private union
(i.e., to organize and regulate a group of laborers with common
interests), the State Bar was also subject to the Abood rule allowing
the use of dissenting member dues for activities germane to that
purpose but not for engaging in non-germane political or ideological
activities that they disagreed with.18
Hence, in Keller, a unanimous Court essentially blessed the
notion that regular taxpayers do not have a First Amendment right
to prevent ordinary government agencies from using their taxes to
promote disagreeable views—thus giving the government speech
doctrine its first official recognition by the Court beyond its humble
beginnings in Justice Powell’s Abood concurrence. Conversely, the
Keller Court held that if a subgroup within the polity is being
compelled to pay into an association for a defined regulatory
purpose, whether that association is called a government entity like
the State Bar or a private entity like the Abood union, dissenting
funders have a First Amendment right to prevent the association
from using funds for disagreeable speech that is not germane to the
regulatory purpose. Another way of saying this is that compelled
associations have no right to use dissenting member funds to
promote their viewpoints over that of the dissenters (i.e., engage in
viewpoint discrimination against them) with respect to nonregulatory matters.
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not expend much intellectual effort
to explain the theoretical basis for this distinction in First
Amendment rights between an ordinary taxpayer and a person being
compelled to associate with others for particular regulatory purposes.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 13–14.
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He merely pointed out that general government representatives need
to be able to advocate for policy decisions they are charged with
making, and if citizens who disagree with such views were able to
silence them, “debate over issues of great concern to the public
would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of
government as we know it radically transformed.”19 In other words,
inherent in our system of democratic majority rule and representative
leadership is a structural subordination, to the government’s need to
govern, of an individual’s general “freedom of belief” on which the
Abood Court premised its First Amendment right against compelled
funding of disagreeable views20—at least when it comes to funding
with general taxes basic governmental functions with which a citizen
may disagree. One might even say that American citizens are
presumed to consent to this subordination when they choose to live
under our system of governance after reaching an age of maturity
when opting out to live under the government of a different country
might be feasible.
Such presumed consent provides the compelled payment of taxes
to support general governance with a democratic legitimacy that
obviously does not obtain in a more limited association (and its
attendant funding) that is compelled to achieve special regulatory
objectives. In the latter cases, it is solely the regulatory interests that
justify the compulsion and consequent override of an individual’s
freedom of belief, and such interests do not justify compelled
funding for activities not germane to achieving them.
But, one might ask, what about compelled taxpayer funding for
disagreeable activities that might be characterized as going beyond
those necessary or germane to general governance? If an individual
enjoys a general freedom of belief, the argument would go, surely it
can only be subordinated to those necessary or germane activities
that can fairly be said to lie within the scope of a citizen’s presumed
democratic consent. For instance, is a legislative decision to fund
abortions, or a president’s decision to call for the honoring of a
national day of prayer, activities that are necessary or germane to
general governance? The difficulty of such an inquiry perhaps
explains Chief Justice Rehnquist’s implied suggestion that it would
simply be impractical for our system of government to operate if
19. Id. at 12–13.
20. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977); see also Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471–72 (1997).
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taxpayers had a constitutional right not to fund disagreeable
government speech. By contrast, when funding is compelled to
achieve defined regulatory purposes, it is easier to draw the
germaneness line and ask whether a given activity falls on one side of
the line or the other. We might refer to this difficulty of determining
the germaneness of general government activities as the
Impracticability Principle of Keller, which justifies the invocation of
the government speech doctrine.
A second principle underlying that doctrine can be derived from
Justice Powell’s observation in Abood, which Chief Justice Rehnquist
quoted in Keller,21 that the government can compel funding for
disagreeable activities because it is “representative of the people” in a
way that a compelled association such as a union is not. This
observation seems to be invoking another aspect of democratic
legitimacy—the notion that it is fair enough for dissenting citizens to
fund government speech that represents the views of the majority
since they have consented to this system. By contrast, such
legitimacy does not obtain in a more limited, compelled association,
and thus cannot serve as a salve for viewpoint discrimination outside
of the association’s core activities. In a later case in which Justice
Kennedy was writing for the Court, he appeared to be elaborating
on this principle by suggesting that the availability of the
government speech doctrine to override First Amendment objections
to it depends on whether the official or agency speaking is subject to
“traditional political controls to ensure responsible government
action.”22 In other words, one can only be sure that government
speech is imbued with democratic legitimacy to the extent that the
government speaker is subject to democratic accountability for its
speech. We can refer to this as the Accountability Principle justifying
the application of the government speech doctrine.
A third principle underlying that doctrine which is derivable from
Keller relates to the speech autonomy interests of the dissenting
funder. In a general governance situation where an ordinary taxpayer
is funding disagreeable government speech, the impingement on her
speech autonomy interests seems fairly attenuated given that she is
just one member of the entire polity contributing to it. On the other
hand, when a select subset of the polity is being compelled to fund
disagreeable speech not germane to the reason for the compulsion,
21. Keller, 496 U.S. at 11.
22. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
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the violation of their autonomy interests seems substantially greater.
This seems to explain Chief Justice Rehnquist’s focus on the fact that
the State Bar was funded by individual member dues, rather than
general legislative appropriations, as a basis for distinguishing that
entity from an agency of general governance.23 We can label this as
the Autonomy Principle justifying the application of the government
speech doctrine.
These three principles, then, the Impracticability, Accountability,
and Autonomy Principles, help to explain the basis for the
government speech doctrine as it was originally conceived and
applied in Keller. Moreover, the Court’s analysis clearly implied that
the doctrine was not to be applied automatically to excuse
infringements on a person’s freedom of belief whenever it could be
said that they occurred in the course of the government itself
speaking. Rather, it suggested that First Amendment scrutiny had to
first be applied to determine if the foregoing principles indicated that
a given case involved the type of government speaker that justified
impingements on that freedom. After all, the Keller Court never
stated that the State Bar was not a government body—indeed, the
Supreme Court of California had determined that it was a state
agency under California law—but just that the State Bar was not the
type of government body that justified the application of the
government speech doctrine to excuse infringements upon the
freedom of belief of dissenting members. Thus, in a later case where
Justice Scalia asserted that the Keller Court deemed the State Bar to
be a private speaker to help justify his recasting of the government
speech doctrine as an absolute exemption from First Amendment
scrutiny whenever any government entity infringes private beliefs in
the course of speaking,24 he was either mistaken or simply
mischaracterizing that decision.
The next compelled speech subsidy dispute to come before the
Court involved a state university student’s challenge to a mandatory
student activity fee that was used to fund speech of student groups
with which he disagreed.25 Thus, this case did not present the
government speech issue addressed by Keller. Nonetheless, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, began his analysis by pointing out
23. Keller, 496 U.S. at 11.
24. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). This issue is discussed
in more depth at infra notes 74–82 and accompanying text.
25. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217.
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that if the objectionable speech had been that of the public
university, different principles would govern and the issue would
have been “whether traditional political controls to ensure
responsible government action would be sufficient to overcome First
Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program under
the principle that the government can speak for itself.”26 Hence, in
Kennedy’s view and consistent with Keller, whether the public
university could avail itself of the government speech doctrine, if it
had been the speaker, depended upon the type of government
agency it was—and how politically responsive it could be said to be
pursuant to the Accountability Principle discussed above. The Court
did not intimate that the university’s speech would have been free
from First Amendment scrutiny simply because a government body
would have been the speaker. And as to the objectionable student
group speech that was at issue in the case, the Court held that the
funding students’ Abood and Keller rights were adequately protected
by requiring that all funding decisions be made on a viewpointneutral basis since it would be impossible to identify speech that was
germane to a university’s broad educational mission (a rationale
similar to the Impracticability Principle applicable to objectionable
government speech).27
The Court’s latest compelled speech subsidy decisions involved
three different cases raising a similar complaint—that the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) was violating the First
Amendment rights of food producers and handlers who objected to
fees levied upon them to fund generic industry advertising
promoting their respective food products. In the first such case,
involving California tree fruit producers and handlers, a closely
divided Court rejected the First Amendment claim on the grounds
that (1) all of the subsidized advertising was germane to a legitimate
regulatory program, was non-ideological in nature, and contained no
messages with which the plaintiffs disagreed (hence satisfying the
principles of Keller), and (2) the challenged law was better classified
as a species of economic regulation than a law abridging speech
which warranted heightened scrutiny.28 The Court had no occasion
to address the potential application of the government speech
doctrine to justify the compelled subsidies because, as the principal
26. Id. at 229.
27. Id. at 229–35.
28. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 467–77 (1997).
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dissenting opinion in the case pointed out, the government chose
not to rely on that argument.29
In the second such case, involving mushroom handlers, a divided
Court reversed course and held that the compelled advertising
subsidies violated the First Amendment under the principles of
Abood and Keller.30 It distinguished Glickman on the grounds that
whereas the advertising fees imposed in that case were ancillary to a
broader regulatory regime involving the production and sale of
California tree fruits, in the case under review, the industry
advertising was the sole regulatory goal.31 Hence, there was no
legitimate regulatory purpose that justified the compelled
association; forced association and subsidies for expressive purposes
only implicated core freedom of belief concerns that outweighed the
economic goals of the program.32 And although the USDA
attempted to argue that the subsidies could be justified under the
government speech doctrine, the Court ruled that the USDA had
essentially waived this argument by failing to raise it in the court
below.33
Thus, presumably after taking the Court’s hint that a properly
raised government speech defense would be seriously considered, in
the third case involving compelled subsidies for industry advertising
of food products (here, beef products) the USDA pressed the
argument and succeeded in winning over a bare majority of the
Court.34 Noting that the beef program was very similar to the
mushroom program invalidated in United Foods, Justice Scalia,
writing for five Justices, nonetheless held that viewing these
programs as the speech of the government cured any First
Amendment problems associated with them.35 Further, viewing them
29. See id. at 483 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
30. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415–16 (2001).
31. Id. at 413–16.
32. See id. at 415–416.
33. Id. at 416–17.
34. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n., 544 U.S. 550 (2005). Although the vote was 63, Justice Ginsburg declined to join Justice Scalia’s government speech analysis and concurred
on other grounds. Id. at 569–70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
35. Id. at 557–67 (majority opinion). This raises the question as to why the government
failed to press the government speech defense in the first two cases. I submit it was something
other than incompetence on the part of the government lawyers. Rather, it was because the
USDA programs in all of the food cases looked more like the State Bar program to which the
Keller court held that the government speech doctrine did not apply. They were defined
regulatory programs administered by specific agencies where the dues used for disagreeable
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as government speech was proper because the USDA ultimately
controlled the message being communicated in the ads.36 So an
identical program that was a violation of a person’s freedom of belief
under Abood and Keller just four years earlier all of a sudden became
constitutional under the theory that whenever speech can be
attributed to any government speaker, that freedom must be
subordinated to the state’s interest in governing.
But how, one might ask, did Justice Scalia get beyond the
teaching of Keller and Southworth that it was not the fact that any
speaker claiming government status was entitled to automatically
elevate its interests over the First Amendment interests of affected
citizens, but only those “traditional government agencies and
officials”37 that “participate in the general government of the
State,”38 such as “a governor, a mayor, or a state tax commission?”39
According to Scalia, in Keller and other cases “invalidating exactions
to subsidize speech, the speech was, or presumed to be, that of an
entity other than the government itself”40—in other words, the
speech of a private speaker. But as mentioned earlier, nowhere in
Keller did Chief Justice Rehnquist refer to the State Bar as a private
entity—in direct contravention of the ultimate authority on that
issue, the Supreme Court of California—but rather as an entity that
was not sufficiently like a “typical government official or agency”41
that required an exemption from freedom of belief constraints in
order to properly function. Thus, with one glib mischaracterization
of the Court’s seminal government speech decision, Justice Scalia
managed to transform that doctrine from one requiring a substantive
analysis of the competing public-private speech interests to
determine if it should apply in a given case, to a blank check for the
government to impinge on citizens’ freedom of belief whenever
speech is characterized as coming from a government speaker. And
speech were levied only on those subject to the regulatory program. In other words, the
Impracticability, Accountability, and Autonomy Principles that drove Keller’s reasoning all
pointed away from a government speech analysis. So it was quite a surprise in Johanns when
the Court did a “180” from its prior decision regarding the virtually identical mushroom
program in United Foods that it said violated the First Amendment, and held that the beef
program did not even merit First Amendment scrutiny because it was government speech.
36. Id. at 561–62.
37. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559.
41. Keller, 496 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added).
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this transformation encompassed all situations involving government
speech, regardless of whether such impingements would be necessary
for a given agency or program to function effectively (the
Impracticability Principle discussed above), or whether the speech
would be sufficiently subject to democratic control (the
Accountability Principle), or whether the burden of the speech
would be evenly distributed or placed on a select group (the
Autonomy Principle).
However, while blithely assuming (contrary to Keller’s explicit
example) that no government entities or programs can operate
effectively subject to a right against compelled funding,42 Scalia at
least addressed the Accountability and Autonomy Principles
underlying the government speech doctrine. As to the former, while
he acknowledged that “[s]ome of our cases have justified compelled
funding of government speech by pointing out that government
speech is subject to democratic accountability,”43 he read that
limitation as simply requiring that government actors control the
message—i.e., that it indeed be government versus private speech—
and not that those actors realistically be accountable to the public for
the speech.44 Indeed, in Johanns itself Scalia concluded that the fact
Congress had created the beef ad funding program and given the
USDA authority to oversee it provided adequate accountability even
though the funded ads identified a private beef industry group
(America’s Beef Producers) as their sponsor.45 Although one might
wonder how one can have government speech at all that is presented
as that of a private speaker, as the three dissenting Justices in Johanns
argued, how can there be true democratic accountability for speech if
the public does not know it is that of the government?46 Simple,
Scalia answered. Just hold the politicians who authorized the speech
accountable for it. But how, one might ask, can the public hold them
accountable without knowing that they were responsible for the
speech? Scalia offered little in response to this problem other than to

42. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559.
43. Id. at 563.
44. See id. at 563–64 & n.7.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 570–80 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, J., and Kennedy, J.).
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note that the dissent cited no authority for the proposition that
government speech identify the government as the speaker.47
As to the Autonomy Principle, citing an inapposite
Establishment Clause case for support, Justice Scalia boldly declared
that a compelled subsidy analysis is “altogether unaffected” by
whether the subsidy is broadly levied on all citizens or whether a
discrete group of citizens is targeted to pay it.48 And rather than
address the problem with selective compelled subsidies—that they
constitute a greater impingement on speech autonomy interests
because of the unequal nature of the compulsion—Scalia dismissed
the entire issue with a blithe rhetorical flourish, observing that “the
injury of compelled funding . . . does not stem from the
Government’s mode of accounting.”49
Hence, the majority in Johanns transformed Keller’s meaningful
approach to the government speech problem that balanced
democratic functionality against freedom of belief interests into a
vapid presupposition that the former concerns should automatically
prevail even in situations not significantly implicating them. The
irony of the bare majority that Justice Scalia received for the Johanns
decision was that Justice Breyer, who later complained strongly
about this approach,50 reluctantly supplied the critical fifth vote for
it. Writing separately, he stated that he would have preferred to
reject the plaintiffs’ compelled subsidy claim on the grounds that the
beef advertising program was a species of economic regulation a la
the reasoning of Glickman, but that he would accept the
government speech approach as a less desirable solution to the food
advertising cases.51
All of this raises the question of why Justice Scalia was so eager
to accomplish the Keller to Johanns transformation of the

47. Id. at 564 n.7 (majority opinion). Indeed, one could envision a very negative public
reaction to the “Beef, It’s What’s For Dinner” ads that were at issue in Johanns if people
perceived that the government was promoting beef consumption after the spate of recent
studies connecting that consumption to an increased risk of cancer or heart attacks. At least the
speech of the State Bar in Keller would have been recognized as such, even though that still
did not satisfy the Court that the government speech doctrine should be applied to it.
48. Id. at 562. In dissent, Justice Souter cogently explained why the Establishment
Clause case Justice Scalia cited for his assertion provided little support for it. Id. at 576 n.4
(Souter, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 563 (majority opinion).
50. See infra notes 83–85.
51. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring).

2082

DO NOT DELETE

2071

3/8/2011 4:21 PM

Emerging Oversimplifications of the Speech Doctrine

government speech doctrine.52 The answer can be found in one of
his concurring opinions from a related case eight years earlier. There,
a majority of the Court held that the First Amendment was not
violated by a statute requiring the National Endowment for the Arts
to take into consideration the values of decency and respect of the
American people in making artistic grant decisions, provided such
decisions did not amount to invidious viewpoint discrimination.53
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred solely in the
result and argued that the “Congress shall make no law abridging
the freedom of speech” language of the First Amendment means
that while the government cannot restrict directly the speech of
private citizens, when it speaks itself or favors private speakers’
viewpoints through grants of money it is not abridging anyone’s
speech.54 In other words, under Scalia’s textualist reading of the First
Amendment, that provision only protects private citizens against
direct restrictions on their speech, and has no application when the
government itself speaks or selectively sponsors the speech or
viewpoints of citizens.
In his Finley concurrence, Justice Scalia was not thinking about
situations involving compelled subsidies of disagreeable speech, but
rather the selective government funding of private speakers. Yet he
obliquely extended his textualist rationale to the former type of
situation in Johanns,55 and, four years later, Justice Alito completed
this reworking of the justification for the government speech
doctrine. Writing for the Court in an unrelated case and citing
52. See infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of certain
intermediate doctrinal developments that undoubtedly abetted this transformation.
53. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580–87 (1998).
54. See id. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is the very business of
government to favor and disfavor points of view on . . . innumerable subjects . . . . And it
makes not a bit of difference . . . whether these officials further their (and, in a democracy, our)
favored point of view by achieving it directly . . . or by giving money to others who achieve or
advocate it . . . . None of this has anything to do with abridging anyone’s speech.”). Scalia
acknowledged two limitations on his principle of viewpoint favoritism. First, where the
government has created a limited public forum for private speech, all viewpoints must be
treated equally. Id. at 599. Second, where a denial of public funding would have a significant
coercive effect on the viewpoints of private speakers because no other funding was available,
there might be a First Amendment problem. Id. at 596–97.
55. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553 (framing question presented as “whether the generic
advertising at issue is the Government’s own speech and therefore is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny”); id. at 559 (asserting that “[w]e have generally assumed, though not
yet squarely held, that compelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First
Amendment concerns”).
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Johanns, Alito asserted that when the government “engag[es] in [its]
own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no
application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”56 Hence,
what began in Keller as a considered judgment about the situations
in which it was appropriate to apply the government speech doctrine
by focusing on the mix of governmental and private speech interests
at stake, became a blanket exemption for the government to override
any conflicting private speech interests in cases where it could be said
to be the principal speaker. And this was accomplished on the back
of Justice Scalia’s textualist theory, which several members of the
Court (primarily the majority conservative bloc) appear to have fully
bought into at this point.
But how convincing is this theory? Not very. In Finley, Justice
Scalia reasoned that since the word “abridge” in the Free Speech
Clause means “to contract, to diminish; to deprive of,” when speech
restrictions are attached to government funding no such contraction
occurs because people can decline the funding and remain free from
them.57 But one could just as plausibly argue that when the
government passes a law attaching speech restrictions to government
subsidies for expression, that is indeed a law “abridging the freedom
of speech” since the funds are contingent upon such an abridgment.
In other words, “make no law” means no law, including those
containing contingent abridgments. Indeed, if one wants to take the
purely textualist approach espoused by Scalia, his reading is less
plausible than the latter reading, since the use of the word “abridge”
signals that even slight impairments on the freedom of speech are
unacceptable—including contingent abridgments. Had the Founders
intended to limit free speech protection to direct restrictions on
speech, one would have thought they would simply have said,
“Congress shall make no laws restricting or prohibiting speech.”
Moreover, even if Scalia’s textualist argument was persuasive as
to conditions placed on the receipt of government speech subsidies a
la Finley, to simply transfer without analysis this interpretation to the
compelled speech subsidies at issue in Johanns is misguided. It might
be one thing to say that the freedom of speech remains unabridged
in the former type of case because one can always decline the
government funding, but this rationale is simply inapplicable to cases
56. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
57. Finley, 524 U.S. at 595–96.
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where a select group of citizens are compelled to fund government
speech with which they disagree. In the latter cases, there is clearly
some abridgment of a citizen’s freedom of belief under precedents
such as Abood and Keller. The correct approach, then, is to consider
whether that abridgment is justified by countervailing government
interests in a given case, and not to simply pretend that there is no
abridgment because a government entity or official is characterized
as the main speaker.
In the end, the Johanns majority sanctions the government
targeting a select group of taxpayers to fund speech no matter how
disagreeable to them, as long as the government claims the speech or
at least does not present it as being from the funders themselves. The
potential problems are manifold. Could, for example, a democratic
Congress pass a law levying a special assessment on doctors’ groups
or health insurers to fund an ad campaign urging the passage of
health care reforms they perceive as detrimental to them? And better
yet, could Congress permit citizens’ groups to participate in the ad
program and then issue the ads under the moniker “Citizens for
Better Health Care?” There is no reason under the Johanns
reformulation of the government speech doctrine that this could not
be done consistent with the First Amendment. Suffice it to say that
Johanns leaves much to be desired in terms of connecting the blanket
First Amendment exemption for government speech it creates to the
theories animating its original conceptualization.
In sum, the government speech doctrine was first recognized by
the Court in Keller as part of an attempt to identify the
circumstances under which it would be appropriate to elevate the
interests of the government in expressing viewpoints in order to
govern over impingements on the freedom of belief of dissenting
funders of such speech. Johanns then morphed that doctrine into an
approach that subordinates the rights of conscience of dissenting
funders in all cases of government speech on flawed theoretical
premises. To be fair to Justice Scalia, however, he did get some
precedential support for this misguided approach from certain
government subsidy speech cases authored by Justice Kennedy that
were decided between Keller and Johanns. The next section will
briefly analyze those cases and describe how they contributed to
derailing the government speech doctrine from its intended purpose.
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III. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY DECISIONS
A year after Keller, the Court decided Rust v. Sullivan.58 There,
with Justice Souter having just replaced Justice Brennan, Chief
Justice Rehnquist was able to muster four other votes for the
position that the government could constitutionally ban the
operators of family planning clinics from providing abortion
counseling as a condition of receiving federal funding, rejecting the
contention that such a ban amounted to viewpoint discrimination
prohibited by the First Amendment.59 The Chief Justice relied on a
line of decisions that he interpreted as standing for the proposition
that although the government must refrain from unduly interfering
with the exercise of constitutional rights, it has no duty to subsidize
them.60 A corollary of this principle, according to Rehnquist, was
that the government may fund certain activities, including speech, to
the exclusion of others.61 The Court made no reference to Keller or
the government speech doctrine.
Four years later, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, built on
this theme from Rust in dictum in a case where a religious student
publication contended that the denial of printing subsidies by a
public university amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination because secular student publications were eligible to
receive them.62 The Court agreed with the plaintiff on the grounds
that the university had created a virtual public forum to encourage
student speech with the funds, and any viewpoint discrimination in
administering them was unconstitutional.63 Kennedy rejected the
university’s reliance on Rust and related cases to argue that contentbased funding decisions to accomplish educational objectives were
constitutional. Instead, he characterized Rust as standing for the
principle that when the government itself speaks or grants funds to
private speakers to convey the government’s own message, it is then
entitled to control that message—including restricting fund
58. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
59. Id. There is little doubt that if Justice Brennan had remained on the Court one
more year, the decision would have gone 5–4 in the opposite direction. Indeed, one suspects
from Justice Souter’s later voting pattern that he would have been on the side of the dissenting
justices if he had possessed a little more experience on the Court when Rust was decided.
60. Id. at 192–200.
61. Id.
62. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
63. Id. at 828–37.
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recipients from expressing conflicting views.64 But in the case under
review, Kennedy reasoned, the government was facilitating the
expression of a diversity of private views through the creation of a
limited public forum.65 Once again, the Court made no mention of
Keller or the government speech doctrine.
Justice Kennedy clearly took some liberties with Rust since the
Court never characterized the government as a speaker or promoter
of a message in that case, but rather simply as a funder of a chosen
set of activities which included certain private speech (i.e., family
planning counseling that excluded discussions of abortion as a
method of such planning). Kennedy later extended this
reconceptualization of Rust in his opinion for the Court in the
Southworth compelled speech subsidy case discussed earlier.66 In
dictum in that case, he set forth the central premise of the
government speech doctrine articulated in Keller—that as a general
rule, the government may use taxpayer money to support its
expression of views that the taxpayer may disagree with—but oddly
cited to Rust, rather than Keller, in support of it.67 One year later,
Kennedy again continued his morphing of Rust in a government
speech subsidy decision where, writing for the Court, he cited to
Rust, Rosenberger, and Southworth to support the proposition that
the government can promote its own views through its speech or
funding decisions.68 But this time he was more candid about the
remaking of Rust, pointing out that “[t]he Court in Rust did not
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities
of the doctors under Title X amounted to government speech; when
interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained
Rust on this understanding.”69 (What he did not say was that they
were all his own majority opinions that had done this.) And
somewhat ironically, two years later in a plurality opinion that Justice
Kennedy did not join, the Court seemed to return to the original
meaning of Rust that the government can choose to fund certain
speech while not funding other types, and explicitly rejected the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 832–34.
Id.
See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540–42 (2001).
Id. at 541.
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characterization of Rust as being dependent upon the government
speaking a message.70
Thus we can see that Justice Kennedy contributed substantially
to the decoupling of the government speech doctrine from Keller, a
case that had a lot to do with that issue, and recoupling it to Rust—a
case having little to do with it. This raises the questions of why
Kennedy did this, and whether it matters. As to why, one suspects it
had something to do with the specific results of Keller and Rust.
Keller was the decision in which the Court validated the principle
that as a general matter the government can take positions contrary
to that of dissenting citizens, but the Court found it inapplicable to
the agency speaking in that case (the State Bar) and decided against
the government’s position. By contrast, in Rust the Court sided on
behalf of the government interests over those of the dissenting
private speakers (the objecting staff of the family planning clinics).
Thus, when Kennedy was seeking support in Rosenberger for the
notion that the government can choose to fund its own messages
through restrictions on private speakers in order to further its
policies, he naturally turned to Rust rather than Keller since the
government had won in that case, and Keller was a compelled
subsidy case rather than a restricted funding decision. The irony is
that in Rosenberger, Southworth, and Velazquez, where Kennedy
uncritically lifted the government speech doctrine out of its Keller
context, his discussions were all dicta since the government was not a
speaker in them.
This raises the question of whether this uncritical translation of
the Keller government speech doctrine to the restricted funding
decisions mattered.71 I would argue that it did since what got lost in
the translation was the principle that just as the government should
not have carte blanche power to compel funding of disagreeable
messages in every case where it speaks, so it should not have similar
powers to impose speech restrictions on private speakers simply
because they receive government money as part of a program that
reflects a particular policy position. In other words, the
Impracticability, Accountability, and Autonomy Principles also have
70. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 211–13 & n.7 (2003).
71. As noted earlier, at least in the compelled subsidy decision in Southworth, Kennedy
acknowledged that, consistent with Keller, there were some constraints on the government’s
ability to escape constitutional scrutiny in those disputes, at least until Justice Scalia abandoned
that notion in Johanns.
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applicability in this context to limit the government’s ability to attach
viewpoint or other restrictions to its funding grants that embody a
given policy choice.
Take Rust, for instance. Even though the Court did not analyze
it as a government speech case, it might very well do so today despite
its later waffling on that issue. And let us say that in addition to the
abortion counseling restrictions required by the family planning
grant program, it also contained a ban on criticizing those
restrictions while operating within the program so as to protect the
pro-life position being promoted.72 Under the current incarnation of
the government speech doctrine, the ban on political criticism—
speech at the core of First Amendment concerns—would not be
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Were the Keller contextual
approach deployed, one would ask whether the three conceptual
pillars of that doctrine support such a result. First, as to
Impracticability, would it be possible to ask whether such a ban was
germane to a legitimate and identifiable regulatory or funding
program? Clearly the family planning grant program would be
amenable to such an analysis, pointing away from a “constitutional
scrutiny exemption” for government speech.
Second, with respect to Accountability, how confident can one
be that there would be meaningful public and political scrutiny of
such a ban? Given that a speech restriction takes speech out of public
discourse rather than affirmatively subjecting a government message
to public scrutiny (as would be the case for compelled funding of
government speech, for instance), any accountability would have to
come from criticism of the ban itself outside of the grant program.
While it is not impossible that this would occur, certainly there
would not be near the public scrutiny of such an action as there
would be if an affirmative government message were being
propounded to the public and identified as such (thus revealing a
substantial weakness in Kennedy’s uncritical importation of the
government speech doctrine into funding restriction cases, and
particularly his reliance on the democratic accountability rationale he
used to justify it). This factor would again point away from an
exemption for our hypothetical funding restriction.

72. Presumably, a ban on criticizing the restrictions outside of the program would face
serious constitutional problems under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine. See Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196–98 (1991).
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Third, as to a restricted grantee’s Autonomy interests, one might
argue that any impingement on his or her speech interests are, like
an ordinary taxpayer in the compelled funding context, fairly
attenuated since a grantee presumably consents to the restriction as a
condition of receiving funding. But how is one to know whether
such consent is truly voluntary in a given situation? One can imagine
that for things like family planning, which is typically provided to
individuals on the lower end of the income and education
continuum, government money would be an important source of
funding where restrictions attached thereto would realistically be
nonnegotiable. And even if consent were truly voluntary, such a
direct viewpoint restriction on what a grantee could say would, by its
very nature, seemingly constitute a greater impingement on one’s
autonomy interests than, say, having one’s money used to fund
disagreeable speech. The Autonomy Principle, then, arguably points
away from a scrutiny exemption in our hypothetical as well.
The point is that not all, if any, speech restrictions attached to
government funding programs that embody a particular policy
position will merit a “constitutional pass” from having the
government’s interests weighed against those of the affected
speakers. Indeed, in our hypothetical it is highly doubtful that the
government’s interest in promoting a pro-life position in the family
planning context would warrant a ban on criticizing the abortion
counseling restrictions—a core political right—in addition to the
basic restrictions on abortion counseling itself. Hence, it seems clear
that the separation of the government speech doctrine from the
concerns which animated its original recognition in Keller—whether
under Justice Kennedy’s uncritical importation of that doctrine into
the restricted funding environment based on a mischaracterization of
Rust, or under Justice Scalia’s attempt to justify that importation
under a textualist rationale—is an unfortunate development in terms
of protecting private speech interests that may be directly and
substantially impacted by government speech activities.
IV. CEMENTING AND EXTENDING A JURISPRUDENCE OF LABELS
Since the compelled funding and government subsidy decisions
culminated in the Johanns blanket First Amendment exemption for
government speech in the last year of the Rehnquist Court (2005),
the Roberts Court has been quick to extend that reformulated
doctrine in two other areas of government-private speech conflicts.
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The first concerns the speech of government employees, and the
second consists of public fora speech. As to the former, the
government speech doctrine seems to have become even further
unhitched from its moorings in the Court’s recent decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos.73 There, writing again for a sharply divided
Court, Justice Kennedy relied on the principles of the government
speech doctrine to hold that a government prosecutor was not
entitled to constitutional review of alleged retaliation against him by
his supervisor for writing a memo accusing police officers of
engaging in misconduct.74 The majority’s theory was essentially that
when a government employee engages in speech pursuant to his or
her job duties, such speech constitutes government speech that lies
outside of First Amendment concerns rather than his or her own
personal speech as a private citizen.75
Prior to Garcetti, in speech disputes between the government
and an employee, the Court had asked whether the employee’s
speech was on a matter of public concern or was a private
employment dispute as the criterion for applying or withholding
First Amendment scrutiny to alleged retaliation for such speech.76 If
the speech was of public concern, as it clearly was in Garcetti, the
First Amendment interests of the employee and the listening public
were deemed to merit constitutional scrutiny in the form of
balancing the importance of those interests in a particular case
against the government’s interest in being able to effectively and
efficiently perform its functions if compelled to tolerate such
speech.77
To simply eliminate this weighing as a blanket rule pursuant to a
government speech theory seems unfounded and unwise. Certainly
the three conceptual pillars of the original doctrine would not
countenance such an approach. With respect to the Impracticability
Principle, the fact that before Garcetti courts routinely engaged in an
assessment of whether government discipline of employee speech on
matters of public concern was necessary for the government to
perform its responsibilities, eliminates any objection that it would be
impracticable to tell whether or not the impingement was required
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 420–24.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 417–20.
Id.
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to accomplish a legitimate regulatory objective. Indeed, as the Court
recounted in Garcetti, the court of appeals had determined that the
government had “failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in
the workings of the District Attorney’s Office as a result of the
memo.”78
As to political accountability for government speech as a
substitute for judicial scrutiny of impingements on private interests
affected by it, like the case of speech subsidy restrictions it is difficult
to see how the government can be held to account for speech
restrictions imposed under the banner of the government speech
doctrine. If the government as employer is allowed to “exercise . . .
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created”
in order to allow the government “to say what it wishes,”79 as Justice
Kennedy would have it, then how is the public to assess the propriety
of a message where the dissenting views of an employee have been
squelched in the name of exercising that control? This turns the
entire notion of democratic accountability for government speech on
its head, particularly since the doctrine as applied in Garcetti has the
effect of making the government less accountable for its potential
misconduct. Imagine if the memo that the prosecutor in Garcetti
had written to his supervisor accurately accused him or her of
improperly covering up police corruption. Under the majority’s
reasoning, since the memo would be government speech there
would be no problem with the supervisor retaliating and suppressing
the memo in order to shape the ultimate message heard by the
public from the district attorney’s office.
With respect to the Autonomy Principle, it seems obvious that
the impact on the speech autonomy interests of a government
employee disciplined for his or her speech on matters of public
concern would be at least as serious as a group targeted with an
assessment to fund speech with which they disagreed. Accordingly,
the three main principles that drove the recognition of a First
Amendment pass for the government to infringe on private speech
interests in the cause of facilitating its functioning seem inapplicable
in the government employee speech cases. And once again, the
uncritical transposition of the government speech doctrine into this
area of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence seems misguided
and fraught with the potential for mischief.
78. Id. at 416 (quotation omitted).
79. Id. at 422 (citation and quotation omitted).
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The second type of speech disputes to which the Roberts Court
has applied the government speech doctrine involves access to public
property for the purpose of expressing a message, and in particular
the right of citizens to install permanent monuments in parks where
the government has previously accepted one or more monuments for
display. In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,80 a religious group
sought to install a permanent monument containing a religious
message in a park where the government had accepted a Ten
Commandments monument from a private donor years earlier.81 The
Court rejected the argument that the park was a traditional public
forum for the display of private monuments, holding that the Ten
Commandments monument had become government speech when
the city accepted it for permanent display and hence this action was
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny or constraints (such as the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in maintaining a public forum).82
Probably one of the least objectionable applications of the
original government speech doctrine sanctioned by Keller to exempt
governmental action from First Amendment scrutiny is its
application to permanent monuments displayed in public parks
under circumstances such as those presented in Summum. In the
ordinary situation, a citizen desiring access to a park to install his
own permanent monument is in much the same situation as a regular
taxpayer who disagrees with general government speech. With
respect to the Impracticability Principle, these cases will rarely
involve defined regulatory programs or objectives by which a court
could measure the germaneness or legitimacy of a speech
impingement in terms of achieving those goals.
Under the Accountability Principle, all the Justices in Summum
seemed to agree that when the government accepts a permanent
monument for display, most people perceive that it is essentially
adopting the message conveyed by it as its own—and citizens can
therefore object to that message if they wish. Although this does not
completely solve the problem of democratic accountability for the
viewpoint exclusion permitted by the government speech doctrine in
these cases, at least the government message contained on the
selected monuments would be prominently open to public scrutiny.
80. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
81. Id. at 1129–30. The park contained other permanent monuments as well that
collectively displayed a theme celebrating the city’s pioneering tradition. Id.
82. Id. at 1131–38.
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Hence, at least that message would presumably bear the imprimatur
of democratic legitimacy. And as to the Autonomy Principle, the
disappointed citizen whose permanent monument is rejected is not
bearing any sort of special or selective burden to support the
monuments that are displayed. Moreover, the private speech interests
in being able to permanently display one’s own monument or
message in a public park hardly seems that substantial given the
myriad alternative avenues one might use to engage in public
expression.
Nonetheless, even here, there is reason to be concerned about
categorically exempting these sorts of cases from First Amendment
scrutiny. For instance, would a permanent memorial donated by
Planned Parenthood celebrating Roe v. Wade be constitutional where
fifty-one percent of a community’s voters consisted of pro-choice
advocates and supported its installation in the face of staunch
opposition by the rest of the community? Or better yet, could a
government backed by that fifty-one percent of voters also reject a
pro-life monument sponsored by the remaining forty-nine percent of
voters who wanted to place it in the park as well? Given the
substantial impingement on the speech autonomy interests of the
dissenting taxpayers in these situations, it seems difficult to believe
that the current Court would countenance the majority’s actions on
a government speech theory.
Perhaps that is why Justice Breyer penned a concurring opinion
in Summum where he joined the majority opinion “on the
understanding that the ‘government speech’ doctrine is a rule of
thumb, not a rigid category . . . . In my view, courts must apply
categories such as ‘government speech’ . . . with an eye towards their
purposes—lest we turn ‘free speech’ doctrine into a jurisprudence of
labels.”83 Indeed, Breyer explicitly argued that had the city in that
case discriminated in its selection of monuments on grounds other
than the “celebration of pioneering” theme displayed in the park,
such as the political grounds posited in my Roe monument
hypothetical, such an action might very well have violated the First
Amendment.84
Justice Breyer’s protest was quite ironic since he supplied Justice
Scalia with the critical fifth vote (albeit while holding his nose) to
give him a majority opinion for his bright line textualist reformation
83. Id. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring).
84. Id.
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of the government speech doctrine in Johanns—the main case relied
on by Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Summum to hold that the
First Amendment was simply inapplicable to the monument dispute.
Breyer’s belated warning85 would not be so unfortunate but for the
mischief that the government speech doctrine will be capable of
accomplishing in a wide breadth of cases—especially through its
application by lower courts looking for a way to expediently deal
with conflicts involving overlapping public and private speech
interests that frequently arise. To take one of many available
examples, a divided panel of a federal court of appeals recently ruled
that the Secret Service could claim immunity for physically ejecting
three citizens from a presidential speech that was open to the public
simply because their car had an anti-war bumper sticker on it.86 The
court ruled that a right against being subjected to such viewpoint
discrimination by the government was not clearly established in
significant part because the government speech doctrine permits
such discrimination against citizens.87 Such is the dubious place
where that revamped doctrine is taking the courts, precisely because
it has not been “appl[ied] with an eye towards [its] purpose[]” in the
Court’s post-Keller jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has traced the recent establishment and evolution of
the government speech doctrine in the Court’s decisions. I have
argued that a concept originally intended to represent an analytical
determination that government impingements on private speech
interests merit an exemption from First Amendment scrutiny in a
limited set of circumstances, has more recently devolved into a
meaningless jurisprudence of labels that unduly subordinates those
interests without inquiry into the merits of competing public
interests. It is my view that this will result in a substantial
diminishment in free speech protections for private speakers in the
myriad of cases where government expression intersects and overlaps
with formerly protected private speech interests. After Justice
85. Justice Breyer’s warning in Summum reminds me of the good Friar Lawrence who
supplies Juliet with a harmless “death potion,” but then sounds the alarm too late for poor
Romeo. After more of these government speech cases, Justice Breyer may also bury his head in
his hands and ask himself, “O, what haveth I wrought?”
86. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7 (2010).
87. Id. at 1165, 1170, 1169 n.1.
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Breyer’s belated epiphany on this issue, it may once again be up to
Justice Kennedy—who refused to join Justice Scalia’s recasting of the
government speech doctrine in Johanns but unqualifiedly joined
Justice Alito’s reaffirmation in Summum of the basic premise of
Johanns—to determine whether he will join his more liberal
colleagues on the Court in an effort to rediscover and reinvigorate
the government speech doctrine’s original purpose.
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